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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
respondent's request, it was filed in the county clerk's office. Appellant
was served with a copy of the judgment and notice of entry on July
17, 1968. Subsequently, appellant served a notice of appeal on the ap-
pellate division, which then granted respondent's motion to dismiss
the appeal since more than thirty days had elapsed since the judgment
had been entered. The Court of Appeals reversed, 10 2 holding that
where a proposed counter judgment submitted by an appellant re-
quires a party to request that it be entered, as opposed to being
automatically entered, and respondent makes the request, appellant's
time to appeal begins to run at the time service of judgment with
notice of entry is made upon him by the respondent and not when
entry of the order is submitted. 0 3
It is incumbent upon the practitioner to be familiar with local
practice; however, it is suggested that one should always serve his
opponent with notice of entry regardless of whose judgment was
entered.
ARTICLE 75-ARBITRATION
CPLR 7503(c): Ten day period within which a party may apply to stay
arbitration construed as statute of limitations by first department.
In Jonathan Logan, Inc. v. Stillwater Worsted Mills,'0  the peti-
tioner, upon being served with a demand for arbitration and within
the ten day period of limitation prescribed by CPLR 7503(c), procured
a signed order to show cause why the arbitration should not be stayed.
However," the order permitted service upon the respondent within a
period six days longer than the ten day limitation.
The first department, by a 8-2 decision, affirmed the lower court's
dismissal of petitioner's application for the stay on the grounds it was
"time-barred." Justice Eager's majority opinion recognized that a
special proceeding was necessary for the court to have jurisdiction over
an application for a stay of arbitration 105 and that a special proceeding
may be commenced by service of an order to show cause. 06 Further-
more, the court acknowledged that the order to show cause was signed
by a judge within the ten day period. However, the decisive fact in
the court's view was that the petitioner failed to serve respondent
within that period. The court held that "the mere signing of the
02 In re Stuart 8- Stuart, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 23 N.Y.2d 493, 245
N.E2d 225, 297 N.YS.2d 576 (1969).
103 Id. at 496, 245 N.2d at 226, 297 N.YS.2d at 578.
104 31 App. Div. 2d 208, 295 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1st Dep't 1969).
105 CPLR 7502(a): "A special proceeding shall be used to bring before a court the first
application arising out of an arbitrable controversy. ...
1O CPLR 804.
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order to show cause does not institute a special proceeding. 107 For a
special proceeding to be commenced, the petitioner should have served
the order within the ten day period.
CPLR 201 commands that "[n]o court shall extend the time
limited by law for the commencement of an action." The first depart-
ment construed this section as mandating the dismissal of petitioner's
application. However, CPLR 2004, which was not noted in the opinion,
allows a court to grant an extension of time for good cause unless other-
wise expressly prescribed by law. 08 By refusing to allow an extension
of time by an order to show cause, without considering the circum-
stances, the court has construed this ten day period as a statute of
limitations, though it has not heretofore been considered as such. 0 9 The
first department's holding restricts the discretion given to the courts
under CPLR 2004, and thereby precludes any extension for whatever
good and meritorious cause a petitioner might have. Since the decision
was rendered by a closely divided court, and because of the potential
harshness which would result from such an interpretation of the sec-
tion, one might think that the other courts would be less prone to
adopt the court's ruling. However, the Court of Appeals, adopting the
first department's opinion, has suprisingly affirmed the Jonathan Lo-
gan holding in a recent, still unreported decision, from which Chief
Judge Fuld and Judge Burke dissented. It is unfortunate that the
Court has sanctioned such a harsh rule without fully explicating its
own reasons for doing so.
CPLR 7503(c): Fourth department upholds effectiveness of service
upon a party's attorney for a stay of arbitration.
In re Bauer,"10 a fourth department case, permits the notice for a
stay of arbitration under CPLR 7503(c) to be served upon the attorney
for the party seeking the arbitration. This decision is diametrically
opposed to the second department's holding in Statewide Insurance Co.
v. Lopez"' that such service does not confer jurisdiction for a special
proceeding.
107 31 App. Div. 2d at 210, 295 N.Y.S.2d at 856.
108 "It should also be observed that CPLR 2004, which confers general power on
the court to 'extend the time fixed by any statute,' does not apply to statutes of limita-
tions ...." 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 201, commentary 40 (1963).
109 Had the delay been due to a misinterpretation, the court would have had power to
extend this time under CPLR 2004. 8 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MjuLER, NEW YORK CIVuL
PlAarxcE 7502.04 (1968).
110 31 App. Div. 2d 239, 296 N.Y.S.2d 675 (4th Dep't 1969). See also The Quarterly
Survey of New York Practice, 43 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 302, 344-45 (1968).
"'l 30 App. Div. 2d 694, 291 N.Y.S.2d 928 (2nd Dep't 1968). See also The Quarterly
Survey of New York Practice, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. Rv. 500, 532 (1969).
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